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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
A most interesting question has been raised by Judge Knox of the United
States district court, southern district of New York, in the case of Elizabeth C.
Taft v. Frank K. Bowers, collector; Gilbert C. Greenway, Jr. v. Frank K. Bowers,
collector, under the 1921 act. A digest of the opinion is as follows:
“No portion of an outright bona fide gift as of the date of delivery can
constitute taxable income in the hands of the donee.”
Under the act of 1921, section 213 (b) 3, the value of property at date of ac
quisition acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent may be excluded from gross
income in computing taxable income. In so far as the 1921 act is concerned,
there is nothing extraordinary in the court’s decision, but in an opinion preced
ing his decision, the learned judge raises the question as to whether the sixteenth
amendment to the constitution conferred the power upon congress to tax gifts
and gives it as his opinion that it did not.
He cites the point that property so acquired is capital, not income, and that
if there is an unearned increment at date of its acquisition, it is that of the
donor, not the donee. He states:
“ If the construction of the tax law for which the government contends
should be applied, it means the donee of the property is to be taxed on the
increment in value which, if it can be regarded as income at all, is income
to another, viz.: the donor. A tax levied upon that increment in the hands
of the donee necessarily results in a direct levy upon the gift. If the gift
consisted of money, would it be argued that the donee is to be taxed on the
difference in value of money; that is, its purchasing power, as between
the date of its acquisition by the donor and the date of its delivery
to the donee? I think not. The money would be regarded as capital
in the hands of the donee; and so, I think that that which may be con
verted into money, as of the date upon which it is given away, must, so
far as the donee is concerned, also be regarded as capital.”

From this logical position there would seem to emanate cognate questions as
to the valuation of property other than cash in determining taxable income.
For instance, if real estate were acquired in 1914, when the purchasing power of
the dollar was indexed at 100 per cent. and sold in 1920 for dollars whose
purchasing power was 38 per cent. should not this fact be taken into account in
computing income? If the purchasing power of the dollar had remained
normal during the past twelve years and a property had been purchased for
$10,000 in 1914, could that property have been sold for $25,000 in 1920? If
sold for the latter amount, could any part of the $15,000 apparent profit be
attributed to increase of actual intrinsic value of the property, or should it have
been attributed to the cheaper money at date of its sale?
These questions have been presented to the commissioner with little satis
faction resulting, but it is hoped that more light will be thrown upon the subject
when the case of Taft and Greenway v. Bowers is passed upon by a higher court
SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
Extraneous evidence showing a contract to be for the sale of all of the cor
porate stock rather than for sale of corporation assets, no tax was collectible
from corporation on profits from the sale, and no fraud was committed by
failure to return such profit.
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The statute of limitations on actions to collect taxes for the fiscal year
ending October 31, 1918—returns being filed April 14, 1919—expired April
14, 1924. (United States district court, W. D. Kentucky, United States v.
Robert V. Board, et al.)
No portion of the value of an outright bona fide gift as of the date of delivery
can constitute taxable income in the hands of the donee, under the act of 1921.
(United States district court, S. D. New York, Elizabeth C. Taft and Gilbert
Greenway v. Bowers, collector.)
Value of one-half interest in California community property which passed to
the wife on the death of her husband, as well as the value of the other one-half
interest of which the husband died seized, was included in gross estate for
estate-tax purposes. (United States district court, E. D. Michigan, S. D.,
Beneficiaries of estate of Edward Henning, deceased, v. United States.)
A claim for additional taxes determined by taking a certain percentage of
taxpayer’s gross sales as net profits was disallowed in absence of extraordinary
circumstances being shown to justify such method. (United States district
court, E. D. of Pennsylvania, In re Max Sheinman, bankrupt.)
TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3891, July 10, 1926)

Section 302 (a): Gross estate.
Community property—California—Opinion of attorney general
1. Estate tax—Gross estate
In determining the gross estate of a deceased husband for the
purposes of the federal estate tax there should be included the
entire value of the community property acquired under the laws
of the state of California.
2. Former opinion withdrawn
Former opinion of the attorney general, under date of October
9,1924 (T. D. 3670 [C. B. IV-1,19]), withdrawn.
The following opinion of the attorney general, under date of June 24, 1926,
is published for the information of internal-revenue officers and others con
cerned. This opinion holds in effect that in determining the gross estate of a
deceased husband for the purpose of the federal estate tax there should be in
cluded the entire value of the community property acquired under the laws of
the state of California.
All pending estate-tax cases, regardless of the date of the deceased husband’s
death, should be disposed of upon the basis of this opinion. In all other
cases where action has been taken upon the basis of the former opinion of
October 9, 1924 (T. D. 3670 [C. B. IV-1, 19]), the necessary steps will im
mediately be taken to protect the interests of the government unless, because of
the statute of limitations, or other provisions of law, such steps are barred.
Particular attention is invited to the fact that the attorney general states
that the treasury department should be left free to litigate to a final con
clusion in the supreme court of the United States the question of whether,
in California, on the prior death of the husband, the entire value of the com
munity property should be included in his gross estate. In cooperation with
the attorney general, the treasury department will endeavor to obtain a de
cision from the supreme court of the United States decisive of the question in
volved, and every effort will be made to expedite the case selected for the test.
The Honorable the Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D. C.
June 24, 1926.
Sir: Under date of March 1,1926, you requested me to reconsider the opinion
of the attorney general dated October 9, 1924 (34 Op. A. G., 395), and
the opinion of the attorney general dated March 8, 1924 (34 Op. A. G., 376),
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in so far as they held that in determining the gross estate of a deceased hus
band in California, for the purposes of the federal estate tax, there shall be in
cluded only one-half of the community property. The request was made in
view of the decision of the supreme court of the United States in the
case of United States v. Reuel D. Robbins (269 U. S., 315), decided January 4,
1926.
In an opinion rendered February 26, 1921 (32 Op. A. G., 435), the attorney
general held that under the community property system as it prevailed in
California the wife had no vested interest in the community property during
the existence of the community, and under that opinion and rulings of the
treasury department the community income in California has been treated as
belonging to the husband, and to be returned by him, under the revenue acts of
the United States, for income-tax purposes.
In December, 1920, the United States district court for the northern district
of California, in the case of Blum v. Wardell (270 Fed., 309), held that under
the California system, on the prior death of the husband, the wife did not
succeed to one-half of the community property as heir and that the half
of the community property to which the wife was entitled on the death of the
husband was not part of the husband’s gross estate for the purposes of the
federal estate tax.
On October 24,1921, this decision was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals
for the ninth circuit. (Wardell v. Blum, 276 Fed., 226.) The supreme court,
on March 6, 1922, denied a petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision
of the circuit court of appeals. (Wardell v. Blum, 258 U. S., 617.)
On March 8, 1924, following the final decision of the case of Wardell v.
Blum, the attorney general rendered another opinion (34 Op. A. G., 376),
modifying the previous opinion of February 26, 1921, and holding that under
the community property system in California the one-half interest to which
the wife succeeded on the death of her husband was not inherited and was not
subject to the federal estate tax. On May 27, 1924, the attorney general
recalled, for further consideration, the opinion of March 8, 1924, but on
October 9, 1924 (34 Op. A. G., 395), he expressed the opinion that the govern
ment would not be justified in instituting new litigation to continue the con
troversy over the question decided in Blum v. Wardell, and he thereupon reaf
firmed the opinion of March 8, 1924.
Your letter does not state whether in applying these opinions you have
included half of the community property in the gross estate of the wife, in
case of her death prior to that of her husband.
There arose afterwards the case of United States v. Reuel D. Robbins, jr.,
et al., a case commenced in the United States district court for the northern
district of California by the executors of the will of Reuel D. Robbins to
recover income taxes claimed to have been illegally assessed and which pre
sented the question whether, under the California community system, income
from community property acquired prior to 1917 and that part of the com
munity income represented by compensation for personal service performed by
the husband during 1918 belonged to the husband or whether the wife had a
half interest in it entitling her to make a separate income-tax return thereof.
The Robbins case was decided by the supreme court of the United States on
January 4, 1926. In that court, elaborate briefs and arguments dealing with
the California community system were presented, and the court held that the
wife in California had no such interest in the community income as to entitle
her to make return of half of it as her income, under the revenue acts of the
United States, for the purposes of income taxation.
While the case of Wardell v. Blum dealt with federal estate taxes, and the
case of United States v. Robbins dealt with income taxes, in my opinion
the questions presented by the two cases were fundamentally the same
and the conclusion reached in the Robbins case is inconsistent with that in
Wardell v. Blum.
In the Robbins case, consideration of the statutes and decisions in Califor
nia, in an effort to analyze the substantial nature of the wife’s interest in the com
munity property, disclosed that during the existence of the community the
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husband had the right to complete dominion, possession, and control of
the community property; that it was at all times liable for the husband’s debts,
both those created before his marriage and his separate debts after his mar
riage; that he might expend the community property and community income as
he pleased without accountability to the wife; that the only restrictions
(prior to 1917) on the husband’s complete dominion were that he might not,
without her consent, give away community property or dispose of household
furniture or her wearing apparel; that the wife had no right to have a share
in the community estate expended for her benefit; that her right to maintenance
and support was not based on the theory that one-half of the community estate
belonged to her, but on a marital obligation of the husband arising out of the
marriage relation; that the wife could not maintain any action during the ex
istence of the community with respect to the community property, and was
not a proper party to a suit involving the community property; that prior to
1923, on dissolution of the community, the wife had no right to make testa
mentary disposition of any part of the community estate; that if the husband
died first the wife succeeded to half of what then remained of the community
property after paying the husband’s debts, including debts incurred by him
before marriage as well as those in connection with his separate estate; that
under an unbroken line of decisions in California the widow took as an heir
and by succession; that the community estate was liable for the debts of the
wife contracted prior to the marriage, the liability being based on the common
law rule that on marriage the husband becomes liable for all the debts con
tracted by his wife dum sola, and in California the statute having exempted
the husband’s separate estate from debts of the wife contracted before mar
riage left only the community estate subject to them; that the community
property was not subject to the separate debts of the wife contracted after
marriage; and that in many other respects the wife in California had none of
the rights in the community property ordinarily connected with ownership
of property.
It was shown that, whatever adjectives or descriptive terms may be used in
an attempt to define the nature of the wife’s interest, when it came to the
ordinary rights of ownership they were completely wanting, and the alleged
ownership of the wife in a share of the community estate in California was
properly described as a “barren ideality.”
All these considerations were advanced in the Robbins case, and, while not
dealt with at length in the opinion, no doubt form the basis for the conclusion
reached. The decision in the Robbins case disposed of the contention relied
on in Wardell v. Blum, based on statutes enacted prior to 1917, that the wife in
California was the owner of a share of the community estate during the exist
ence of the community.
Two statutes were enacted in California in 1917, which were considered in
Blum v. Wardell, but only one of which affected the community property in
volved in the Robbins case. One was section 172a of the California code,
enacted in 1917, providing that the wife must join with the husband in convey
ances of community real estate. That statute has been held by the supreme
court of California not to apply to community real estate acquired prior to its
passage, so it did not operate on the income from community property involved
in the Robbins case, and, of course, it did not affect the income from personal
service involved in the Robbins case, as that was personal and not real property.
That statute did not, in my opinion, operate to create in the wife an ownership
in community real estate which did not exist before. (Spreckels v. Spreckels,
172 Cal., 775, 782.) The statute does not relate to all community property,
but only to real estate, and it merely provides for a limitation upon the husband’s
power to dispose of it.
In states where the community system has never prevailed, and the wife
has a dower interest or other inchoate statutory interest in the husband’s
real estate, statutes are found making the husband’s separate conveyance of his
own real estate, without the consent of the wife, inoperative to defeat her inter
ests, but it has never been suggested that the effect of such a statute was to make
the wife during coverture the owner of an interest in her husband’s real estate.
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The other statute, dealt with in the case of Wardell v. Blum, was an act of
1917 (statutes of 1917, p. 880), which amended the inheritance-tax law of that
state. That statute did operate on the property involved in the Robbins case,
was discussed in the briefs, and no doubt was considered by the court.
An inheritance-tax law had been in effect in California since 1905, and under
it the interest in the community estate to which the wife succeeded on the
husband’s death was subjected to an inheritance tax, on the ground that she
took as an heir and had no vested interest prior to her husband’s death. (In
re Moffitt's estate, 153 Cal., 359; Moffitt v. Kelly, 218 U. S., 400; Estate of Rossi,
169 Cal., 148; Chambers v. Lamb, 186 Cal., 261.) The act of 1917, amending the
inheritance-tax law, contained the following provisions (p. 881):
“. . . that for the purpose of this act the one-half of the community prop
erty which goes to the surviving wife on the death of the husband . . . shall
not be deemed to pass to her as heir to her husband, but shall, for the purpose
of this act, be deemed to go, pass, or be transferred to her for a valuable and
adequate consideration, and her said one-half of the community shall not be
subject to the provisions of this act; provided, further, that in case of a transfer
of community property from the husband to the wife, . . . one-half of the
community property so transferred shall not be subject to the provisions of this
act; and provided, further, that the presumption that property acquired by
either husband or wife after marriage is community property, shall not obtain
for the purpose of this act as against any claim by the state for the tax hereby
imposed; ...”
In Wardell v. Blum, both the district court and the circuit court of appeals
treated this amendment as changing the intrinsic nature of the wife’s interest
in the community estate, notwithstanding that after the passage of the act of
1917 the wife had no greater right to exercise any attribute of ownership than
she had before the passage of the act of 1917. That act did not change the
essential nature of her interest or of the husband’s interest, and did not convert
an interest which was a proper subject for an inheritance tax into one which
was not. The only effect of the statute was to exempt from payment of the
tax a transfer or succession which in its essential nature was properly subject
to an inheritance tax. If, prior to the act of 1917, the nature of the wife’s
right and succession was such as to enable the state to levy an inheritance tax
on her succession, that power still existed after the act of 1917, and by another
statute making no change in the respective rights of the husband and wife in
the community property the wife’s succession on the death of the husband
could again have been subjected to an inheritance tax. The very language of
the act of 1917, quoted above, shows that the legislature recognized that on the
death of the husband one-half of the community property “goes to” the sur
viving wife, and that upon the death of the husband a share of community
property is deemed “to go, pass” to the wife, and the reference to a “trans
fer” of community property from husband to wife indicates a passage of title
to the wife of something previously belonging to the husband, and it seems
obvious on the face of the statute that it was intended merely to create an
exemption.
If additional ground be needed to show that the inheritance-tax act of 1917
did not change the nature of the wife’s interest in the community estate, it
will be found in section 24 of article IV of the constitution of California,
which provides that every act shall embrace but one subject, which shall be
embraced in its title. The title of the act of 1917, exempting the wife’s succes
sion to the community estate from an inheritance tax, is:
“An act to establish a tax on gifts, legacies, inheritances, bequests, devises
successions and transfers, to provide for its collection and to direct the dis
position of its proceeds.”
There is not a word in the title indicating a change in the nature of the
wife’s interest in the community property, and if the body of the act had
attempted such a change the provision would have been void. To say, therefore,
that the act of 1917 operated to prevent the imposition of a federal estate tax
on the transfer to the wife of a half interest in the community estate upon
the prior death of the husband is equivalent to holding that if a state exempts
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from a state inheritance tax a transfer of a nature essentially subject to such
a tax, the exemption by the state operates to make the succession immune from
a federal estate tax. Prior to the California act of 1917, exempting the wife’s
succession from the state inheritance tax, the courts of California had held
that the nature of the succession was such as to make it subject to an inherit
ance tax. They had held that the wife had no interest or ownership prior to
the dissolution of the community, and that the interest to which she succeeded
on the prior death of her husband came to her by inheritance and not by virtue
of prior ownership. Admittedly, if the succession was such as to subject it
to a state inheritance tax, that fact made the transfer of such a nature as to
be subject to a federal estate tax; and as the California legislature did not
make any change by the 1917 act in the nature of the wife’s interest, her suc
cession to an interest in the community estate upon her husband’s death
was left a proper subject of a federal estate tax.
Act of 1917 was not in any sense a repudiation of the decision of the Cali
fornia court in the Moffitt case. The Moffitt case was decided in 1908, and long
before that the California court had held that the wife took as an heir. (In
re Burdick (1896), 112 Cal., 387; Sharp v. Loupe (1898), 120 Cal., 89.)
The passage in 1905 of the inheritance-tax law of California must have been
with the legislative understanding that the wife’s succession, by previous deci
sion of the courts, was of such a nature as to be subject to the tax.
The rule thus announced in the Moffitt case stood for nine years, and through
several sessions of the California legislature. The act of 1917, exempting the
wife’s interest from the state inheritance tax, was no more a legislative disap
proval of decisions of the courts of the state than is any other statutory change
in existing law.
Since the case of Wardell v. Blum was decided, and in 1923, the legislature of
California amended the statutes of that state by conferring upon the wife
a power of disposition by will of one-half of the community property. Section
1401 of the civil code of California, prior to 1923, provided:
“ Upon the death of the wife, the entire community property, without admin
istration, belongs to the surviving husband.”
By the amendment of 1923 (statutes of 1923, p. 30), it was provided:
“Upon the death of either husband or wife, one half of the community prop
erty belongs to the surviving spouse; the other half is subject to the testa
mentary disposition of the decedent, and in the absence thereof goes to the
surviving spouse, subject to the provisions of section 1402 of this code.”
Section 1402, as amended in 1923, provides:
“Community property passing from the control of the husband either by
reason of his death or by virtue of testamentary disposition by the wife, is
subject to administration, his debts, family allowance and the charges and ex
penses of administration; but in the event of such testamentary disposition by
the wife, the husband, pending! administration, shall retain the same power to
sell, manage, and deal with the [community personal property as he had in her
lifetime; . . .”
By this statute, the California legislature seems to have taken a step toward
giving the wife one, at least, of the rights usually pertaining to ownership of
property, and yet the step was half-hearted, because the statute seems to leave
unchanged the rule that community estate is not subject to the wife’s debts,
and leaves the share which she may dispose of by will subject to the payment
of the husband’s individual debts, but not of her own. Whether this statute
will be held by the California courts to apply to community property acquired
before its passage remains to be seen. The decision of Roberts v. Wehmeyer
(191 Cal., 601) gives rise to the expectation that the act of 1923 may be held
inapplicable to the community property acquired before its passage.
No opinions of the supreme court of California rendered since the decision
of the Robbins case have been called to my attention which threw any new
light on the problem. The decision of Blethen v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co.
(243 Pac. Rep., 431) (decided February 1, 1926) confirms in every respect the
view of the California law taken by the supreme court of the United States in
the Robbins case.
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It has been suggested that no action be taken toward relitigating the ques
tion decided in Wardell v. Blum until decision is handed down by the
supreme court of California in the case of Stewart v. Stewart, an action insti
tuted in January, 1926, by a wife against a husband, relating to a tract of
community real estate acquired by the husband in 1916, to determine adverse
claims and to have it adjudged that the wife is the owner in fee simple of an
undivided one-half.
It is not apparent that any decision which may be rendered in that case
will have any conclusive effect on the question we are dealing with. That
case was a “friendly” suit brought for the purpose of eliciting an expression
of opinion from the supreme court of California as to the proper descrip
tive term or label to be applied to the wife’s interest in the community real
estate.
In my opinion, in dealing with this subject heretofore, too much effort has
been expended in hunting for cases in which the wife’s interest in the com
munity real estate is described as a “vested” interest, or as “ownership,”
or as a “mere expectancy.” The solution of the problem requires us to
go deeper and, discarding merely general descriptive terms, to ascertain the
real nature of the wife’s interest by determining whether she may exercise
or enjoy the ordinary rights of ownership.
The Stewart case does not seem to give to the supreme court of California
an opportunity to pass anew on any such aspect of the matter, or to deter
mine whether the community estate is subject to the wife’s debts, or whether
she has any right to have any part of it expended for her benefit, or whether
the husband may expend it as he pleases without accountability, or to pass on
any other point which would throw any light on the intrinsic nature of the
husband’s and wife’s interests.
While the federal courts are bound by the decisions of state courts of
California as to the nature of the wife’s interest in the community prop
erty, that rule does not mean that adjectives or descriptive terms which may
be applied by state courts will be blindly accepted by the federal courts;
but the latter, in passing on the incidence of the federal estate tax, are en
titled to examine the statutes, and the decisions of the state courts which
dissect and throw light on the intrinsic nature of the wife’s interest, to
determine whether the general descriptive phrases applied to the wife’s
interest correctly describe it.
It is suggested that the re-enactment of the federal estate-tax provisions
of the revenue acts, after the rulings by the attorney general and the treasury
department, should be considered a legislative adoption of them. The rule
that the re-enactment of a statute after an administrative construction of it
is a legislative adoption of the construction has no application to this
case.
The question here is not one of construction of the revenue acts of the
United States, but as to the nature of the wife’s interest in the community
property, a question requiring interpretation of the statutes and decisions of
the state of California. Neither the opinions of the attorney general nor the
rulings of the treasury department were based on any interpretation of the
acts of congress.
The estate-tax provisions of the revenue acts have been admittedly broad
enough to impose an estate tax if there was an inheritance by the wife from
the husband. Congress could not by any amendment to the revenue acts have
changed the effect of the state statutes and decisions.
In addition, the uniformity clause in the constitution of the United States
must be considered. If in California the wife has no ownership in the com
munity property, and her interest is no more real than the interest of the wife
in the husband’s property in other states where the community system does
not prevail, to exempt from the federal estate tax, on the death of the hus
band, a part of the community property in California would result in a viola
tion of the uniformity clause.
I feel constrained, therefore, to withdraw the former opinion, so as to leave
you free to litigate to a final conclusion in the supreme court of the United
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States the question whether in California, on the prior death of the husband,
the entire community property should be included in his gross estate.
Test cases should be instituted to have these questions decided. The above
discussion indicates that more than one such case is necessary to present every
aspect of the matter and deal with estates affected by the statutes of 1917 and
1923, and those which are not.
Respectfully,
Jno. G. Sargent,
Attorney General.
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